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Abstract.  This analysis re-instates the importance of the 1958 British intervention in Jordan 
within the study of Anglo-American relations and the revisionist literature on Suez. It does so 
by challenging the idea of British subservience to American foreign policy after the 1956 
crisis, and it reveals two key lessons learnt by London: that Britain’s economy, power, and 
influence were in decline and that Britain could no longer intervene in the Middle East 
without American support. Having learnt these lessons, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
proved to be a shrewd political actor who used the opportunity of the Jordan intervention to 
turn the policy of the Dwight Eisenhower Administration to British ends, regaining Britain’s 
maximum power and prestige for the minimum loss of resources. 
 
 
 
 
Historians have widely concluded that the 1956 Suez crisis was a watershed moment for both 
British foreign policy and Anglo-American relations.
1
 In foreign policy terms, the events 
heralded the end of Britain’s “moment” in the Middle East that signalled the beginning of a 
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change in the dynamics of the region as Britain shifted from a role as an Imperial Power to 
one of junior partner to the United States.
2
 For the “special relationship”, the events rocked 
relations on both sides of the Atlantic: American diplomatic and economic pressures 
eventually forced the humiliating British withdrawal from Egypt. Immediately after the 
events, the State Department official in charge of Britain declared that the effect of Suez on 
Anglo-American relations “has been the rupture of the fabric of mutual confidence upon 
which the alliance rests.”3 Harold Macmillan, who succeeded Anthony Eden as British prime 
minister in January 1957, noted in his diaries, “There was an equal sense of disillusionment 
on both sides. It seemed as if the long tradition of close co-operation which had been brought 
to such a high degree of confidence and respect was now seriously, if not fatally damaged.”4  
 Yet, in contrast to the premierships of his Conservative predecessor, Eden, and 
Labour successor, Harold Wilson, Macmillan’s time as prime minister has been acclaimed as 
the “golden days” of the trans-Atlantic alliance.5 This result was surprising as Macmillan, 
Eden’s chancellor of the Exchequer during the Suez crisis, had on-going feelings of 
resentment towards the Administration of President Dwight Eisenhower. He later recalled in 
his diary that he felt American handling of Suez had been “almost hysterical outbursts”.6 
Early drafts of his memoirs also pejoratively referred to Eisenhower and his secretary of 
state, John Foster Dulles, as “inept” and “emotional and vindictive” over the events.7 
However, Macmillan had learnt that he needed American support for the future. He noted the 
difficulty and importance of regaining the relationship in his memoirs: 
How were we to treat the United States, and to re-establish that alliance which I knew 
to be essential in the modern world? Nor would it be worth arguing whose fault it 
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was. Somehow, without loss of dignity and as rapidly as possible, our relationships 
must be restored.
8
 
Consequently, he worked to develop a new closeness between Washington and London that 
would last from Eisenhower to the presidency of his successor, John F Kennedy.
9
  
The argument exists that the compromise for the renewed relationship after Suez was 
British subservience to American policy.
10
 In contrast, another posits that Britain defended its 
regional interests against the Americans throughout the 1960s and beyond.
11
 Still another 
stresses on-going confrontations between the allies regarding policy in the Middle East.
12
 
The events surrounding the 1958 intervention in Jordan are crucial within this debate.
13
 The 
military operation, “Operation Fortitude”, was Britain’s first new intervention in the region 
after the disaster of Suez and was thus risky and controversial.
14
 Even Macmillan described 
the proposed operation to the Cabinet as a “quixotic undertaking”.15 However, the operation 
is most significant for revealing in microcosm a prime minister determined to keep control of 
the situation, pulling strings from behind the curtain to engage and manage the Eisenhower 
Administration in a way that would protect British interests with the use of American assets. 
Macmillan was shrewd, pragmatic, and determined to get American political, diplomatic, 
military, and economic support for Britain’s return to the region, allowing Britain to regain 
maximum prestige and power with the minimum risk and loss of resources. For this reason, 
British intervention in Jordan in 1958 is a crucial, yet under-appreciated, event in the study of 
Anglo-American relations and British foreign policy in the Middle East. The study of this 
operation not only challenges existing ideas about the post-Suez relationship and reveals 
Macmillan’s approach and skill in handling the lessons of Suez.  It also provides the first 
example of the lesson that remains firmly within all British foreign policy and military 
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planning today: all British interventions in the Middle East should take place with American 
support. As Macmillan declared on the eve of the landings in Jordan “We would rather be 
wrong together than right separately”.16 
 Following the disastrous Suez affair, there was a great clamour to draw lessons from 
the events to inform the handling of crises in the future.  Presumably, to avoid any 
investigation that may have revealed the Anglo-French-Israeli collusion over Suez, the 
government refused to hold any public or parliamentary committee-based lesson learning 
enquiries.
17
 Official histories proposed by the Foreign Office and the suggestion of the 
publication of “Lessons Learned” reports by the Ministry of Defence were also vetoed.18   
 Despite government protestation, some learning occurred within Whitehall evidenced 
through reflections recorded in reports, assessments, meeting minutes, conference notes, and 
despatches.
19
 These included the “Lessons Learned” despatch prepared by the commander-
in-chief of the Allied Forces during the Suez campaign, Sir Charles Keightley. In explaining 
the increasing importance of world opinion as a principle of war, he concluded that the 
actions of the United States prevented the British military from obtaining their objective.
20
 
For him, the key lesson to ensure future operational success was to work with the United 
States: 
This situation with the United States must at all costs be prevented from arising again. 
Conversely a united Anglo-American position would have assured a complete success 
of all our political objects with the minimum military effort. The achievement of this 
is a political matter but the effects on military operations are vital.
21
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The Chiefs of Staff circulated and discussed Keightley’s report in detail.22  Macmillan also 
read it; and he had a violent reaction to the Ministry of Defence proposal to publish the 
despatch.
23
  
At the same time, Sir Guy Millard, who served as both Eden and Macmillan’s private 
secretary for foreign affairs, produced another lesson-learning document.
24
 His paper focused 
on recording an account of the events of Suez from a British perspective and identifying 
some lessons for the future. It concluded:  “For Britain, Suez was a climacteric. It had 
severely shaken the basis of Anglo-American relations and exposed the limitations of our 
strength. This fact defined the conditions within which British foreign policy must henceforth 
operate.” 25 For Millard, there were two clear lessons for the future:  
We could never again resort to military action, outside British territories, without at 
least American acquiescence. Our capacity to act independently had been seen to be 
closely circumscribed by economic weakness. The experience of Suez may have led 
to a re-assessment of British interests and of our relative position in the world.
26
 
These were strong but insightful words, which recognised the future importance of working 
with the Americans and a new understanding about Britain’s position in the world, an 
awareness of which had begun to echo elsewhere in government. 
Nine months earlier, Eden had offered similar reflections upon the lessons of Suez, 
which he had sent to the Foreign Office. At the end of five pages of manuscript notes, he 
concluded that Suez had forced a reassessment of Britain’s place in the world and its 
international relationships. Eden wrote, “The conclusion of all this is surely that we must 
review our world position and our domestic capacity more searchingly in the light of the 
Suez experience, which has not so much changed our fortunes but revealed our realities”.27  
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The questioning of Britain’s international position had also led the government’s Foreign 
Affairs Steering Committee to reconsider “British Obligations Overseas”.28 The resulting 
paper, produced in April 1958, reported that Britain had two endeavours: first, to maintain 
world peace, order, and essential interests overseas and, second, improve Britain’s economic 
position. There were five aims to achieve the first objective, two of which would become 
particularly relevant in the summer of the same year: “to maintain a large measure of identity 
between British and American interests” and “to maintain political conditions favourable to 
our trading requirements throughout the world, and especially in the Middle East.”29 
 However, the paper also concluded that Britain had a number of problems in the 
Middle East that were proving challenging to obtaining favourable conditions including the 
rise of radical nationalism, the relic of colonialism, and a divergence of interests between 
Britain and the oil producing and transit states. Furthermore, attacks on colonial, strategic, 
and commercial interests had become difficult to prevent as the cost of conquering and 
occupying a territory was no longer economically viable. The stark conclusion reached by the 
Committee was, “We are no longer in a position to ‘go it alone’”.30 Instead, Britain’s could 
only achieve its objectives by working with the Americans: “promoting United States 
involvement and the harmonisation of the Anglo-American policy”.31 
 The Conservative Party had also reached the same conclusion. On 9 July 1958, five 
days before the Jordan crisis began, the Conservative Parliamentary Foreign Affairs 
Committee considered the issue of the Middle East and, more specifically, intervention in 
Lebanon. During the course of the discussion, one member, Nigel Nicolson, remarked that he 
did not think that an intervention in Lebanon would have any parallels with the Suez 
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operation “if only because the lesson of Suez was that we must have American (and if 
possible Iraqi) support. These we had in respect to Lebanon.”32   
 These various reports reveal that Suez produced two key lessons learnt: that Britain’s 
economy, power, and influence were in decline and that Britain could never again intervene 
in the Middle East without American support. They also demonstrate that these lessons 
remained clearly identified in a number of different institutions, fora, and documents with 
which Macmillan would have been connected.  It is clear that they had become important 
ideas across government within the military, the Cabinet, the Prime Minister’s Office, the 
Foreign Office, and the Conservative Party. It would also soon become clear, by Macmillan’s 
actions, that he had learnt the same lessons and intended to re-build the Anglo-American 
relationship as soon as possible to influence American policy in ways that would help him to 
manage Britain’s inevitable decline but with the minimal loss of interests. 
 In fact, Macmillan had long held convictions about the potential for Britain to 
manipulate the Americans in a “Machiavellian fashion”.33 Meeting Macmillan at Allied 
Force Head Quarters during the Second World War, Richard Crossman, the head of the 
German section of the Political Warfare Executive, recalled an analogy made by the future 
prime minister of the Americans as akin to the Romans and the British to the Greeks. For 
Macmillan, the British were culturally and intellectually superior to the Americans, as the 
Greeks had been to the Romans, and could use this advantage to manage their United States 
counterparts.
34
 Similar ideas had also informed the Labour government during 1945-1951, 
whilst Eden had later explicitly examined a strategy of “power by proxy” through the 
Americans.
35
 These ideas continued into Macmillan’s premiership and proved vital in the 
handling of the Jordan crisis. 
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 Even before his succession to the premiership, Macmillan had been quick to try to 
repair the Anglo-American relationship resulting from Suez. After a North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation meeting in Paris on 12 December 1956, he took the opportunity to visit Dulles 
to speak to him in confidence and begin to smooth over the situation. During the course of 
their conversation, he indicated that he had disagreed with Eden’s decisions over Suez, 
particularly regarding the United States, and revealed that he was hoping for a government 
shift to lead him or Richard Butler, the Conservative leader of the House of Commons, to the 
premiership.
36
 
 As soon as Macmillan became prime minister, he and his foreign secretary, John 
Selwyn Lloyd, gave priority to Washington. With British interests in mind, they immediately 
looked to develop a working partnership for the Middle East. In January 1957, Macmillan 
sent an invitation to Eisenhower to meet, work to improve the Anglo-American alliance, and 
publicly demonstrate Anglo-American friendship.
37
 That Macmillan was the instigator of 
these events was significant. During the Second World War, he had witnessed first-hand at 
the January 1943 Casablanca conference the relationship between Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt; he was deeply impressed at how the two leaders 
worked together.  Like Churchill, he had an American mother – a connexion that could be 
emphasised – and, most significantly, he already had an established relationship with 
Eisenhower to draw upon and use to his advantage. During the Second World War, 
Eisenhower and Macmillan served together in North Africa: Eisenhower as the supreme 
commander of the Allied forces in Europe and Macmillan as Eisenhower’s British political 
advisor.  
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The result of Macmillan’s invitation was the Bermuda conference held in March 
1957, which, amongst other issues, saw discussions about the Middle East and revealed that 
the United States was equally keen to restore working relations in the region.
38
 A State 
Department position paper for the conference stressed the importance of maintaining the 
British as a Middle Eastern ally with an aim to develop “mutually consistent policies”.39 At 
the conference, any discussion of Suez proved still to be too raw – Eisenhower noted in his 
memoirs that he and Dulles “found it difficult to talk constructively with our British 
colleagues about Suez because of blinding bitterness they felt”.40 Nonetheless, both 
Macmillan and Eisenhower sought to reassure each other of their positions. Macmillan 
declared that the British were “committed to stay in the game and cooperate with the United 
States”, whilst Eisenhower advised the British that he wanted to “build them up again in the 
Middle East”.41 
 Following the Bermuda conference, Macmillan pushed for an additional meeting to 
strengthen the re-building relationship. Another conference was organised later in the same 
year at Washington. The American ambassador to Canada, Livingston Merchant, wisely 
noted in a memorandum to Dulles: “I think that the request by Mr. Macmillan for the 
meeting constitutes a supreme effort by the British to regain their war-time position of 
exclusive and equal partnership with the U.S.”42 Nonetheless, Washington was equally keen 
to re-build the relationship and, in a conversation with Selwyn Lloyd, Dulles stated his hope 
that the conference would “mark the beginning of a new and closer phase in Anglo-American 
relations”.43 
 Again, the Washington conference saw discussion of Middle Eastern issues where the 
prime minister sought further to institutionalise Anglo-American co-operation.
44
 As a result, 
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several joint working groups emerged to produce co-ordinated planning and policy 
approaches.
45
 For Macmillan, this process revealed a success in his efforts to a renewed 
relationship, and he declared to the Cabinet, “The prevailing mood in Washington had 
therefore been favourable to proposals for closer Anglo-American co-operation”.46  One 
working group was set-up to focus on Lebanon. Over time, Macmillan had become keen to 
find an opportunity to return to the Middle East region and reassert British power; but having 
learnt the lesson of Suez, he wanted this result to be achieved having British forces stand 
side-by-side with American soldiers in a strong demonstration of renewed trans-Atlantic 
unity. By November 1957, his attention had begun to focus upon pro-active joint military 
planning for intervention in Lebanon and Jordan in the event of a coup there.
47
 The British 
Cabinet had already tentatively decided that if the Lebanese president, Camille Chamoun, 
requested military intervention, “the United Kingdom should respond favourably, if the 
United States agreed.” As a result, the British and Americans developed contingency plans: 
“Operation Shamrock” succeeded by “Operation Bluebat”.48  
 However, during this contingency planning for Lebanon, Macmillan placed more and 
more emphasis on joint intervention to accelerate and institutionalise re-building the Anglo-
American relationship. This emphasis went too far too quickly, and the Eisenhower 
Administration soon felt that the British were becoming overly hawkish, moving planning 
from contingency to immediate intervention. Dulles advised the British ambassador, Harold 
Caccia, “some of our people, not just in Washington but elsewhere, had the impression that 
we were being crowded by our British colleagues into intervention in Lebanon”.49 In fact, the 
Americans felt that they had to “cool down the British and their enthusiasm for immediate 
action”,50 especially as there were remaining concerns within the Administration about 
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establishing too close a military association with a former Imperial Power.
51
 The Americans 
became suspicious about London’s intentions and nervous about their implications. By June 
1958, United States policy on joint intervention seemed to have shifted irrevocably. A special 
National Intelligence Estimate focused on the possible consequences of United States action 
in Lebanon and concluded, under the heading “Effect of UK Participation”: “We believe that 
[an] adverse reaction would be intensified if the UK participated.”52  
 The British seemed unaware of this change in policy. However, the Foreign Office 
and Chiefs of Staff sensed a retreating commitment on the part of the Americans to joint 
planning. The principal private secretary to Selwyn Lloyd, Denis Laskey, complained of 
“dilatoriness” in American Middle East policy, and Caccia agreed that the Americans had 
been “rather slack” in committing to concrete contingency plans.53 Nonetheless, a new 
opportunity soon emerged for Macmillan to manage the return of British troops to the Middle 
East to protect British interests. He was determined to maximise this opportunity to achieve 
his long-standing objectives informed by the lessons of Suez.  
 In February 1958, Syria and Egypt merged to become the United Arab Republic 
[UAR] with Abdel Gamal Nasser, the Egyptian president, as its leader, thus increasing his 
power and influence as well as that of his Soviet supporters. Less than two weeks later, to 
balance Nasser and the UAR, the Hashemite monarchies and Western allies, Iraq and Jordan, 
formed the Arab Union, igniting an intense propaganda battle between the two new polities.
54
 
On 14 July 1958, the Iraqi monarchy, which had been installed by Britain upon the founding 
of Iraq in 1922, was unexpectedly overthrown in a bloody coup d’état. An Arab nationalist 
group, the Free Officers led by Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim, murdered King Faisal II, the 
Regent and Crown Prince, Abd al-Ilah, and the premier, Nuri al-Said.  News of the coup 
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reached London through American intelligence, reporting the overrunning of the British 
Embassy in Baghdad and its setting on fire; there was immediate suspicion of Nasser’s 
involvement.
55
  The coup had a substantial ripple effect in the region: a Western ally, the 
Arab Union, had effectively dissolved; the 1955 Baghdad Pact – the British-led regional 
defence agreement aimed at preventing Soviet Russian influence in the region – was 
threatened; and the visible rising tide of Arab nationalism left many Middle Eastern leaders 
nervous over their own positions. Chamoun immediately called on the American and British 
ambassadors to request a military intervention to defend against a similar fate in Lebanon.  
 Despite the contingency planning for intervention in Lebanon, and the previous 
British desire to push for a joint intervention in the country, there was concern amongst the 
Cabinet that a similar request from Jordan may not be far behind. There were also concerns 
over the security of Kuwait and question of whether intervention in Iraq was a possibility – 
all of which were areas where British interests were described as “paramount” in comparison 
to Lebanon. The Cabinet therefore concluded that although any action in response to the 
request had to occur as part of an Anglo-American plan, it was prudent to allow the 
Americans to take the lead in Lebanon with only “a small token British contribution”. This 
action would achieve two objectives: visibility of a joint intervention whilst retaining 
sufficient troops to take the initiative elsewhere in the region.
56
  
 However, Eisenhower had different ideas and opposed any participation by British 
troops, even a symbolic force.
57
 Instead, he wanted to act unilaterally, setting aside 
previously discussed contingency plans to avoid the appearance of protecting colonial 
interests and negate the opportunity for the French to demand inclusion. As Macmillan noted 
in his memoirs, this time it was the Americans who would “go it alone”: “This was indeed a 
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strange reversal of the situation only eighteen months before.”58 In fact, he declared that 
American actions were “a recantation – an act of penitence – unparalleled in history.”59 
However, Suez tensions must have eased since Bermuda as when Eisenhower telephoned 
Downing Street to inform it of his decision, Macmillan joked, “You are doing a Suez on 
me”.60 
 Fortunately for the prime minister, another opportunity quickly presented itself. 
Whilst Eisenhower was making his decision on Lebanon, a second request arrived from King 
Hussein of Jordan for an assurance that he would also receive military support if required.
61
 
There had also been a contingency plan in place to support Jordan, “Operation Broil”, and 
the Cabinet Defence Committee had begun to prepare urgent plans for sending troops to 
Jordan as soon as the news of the Iraqi coup reached London.
62
 The Committee pre-
emptively considered the military implications of an intervention in Jordan the following 
day.
63
 The Foreign Office received immediate instructions to begin working with the State 
Department to recommend wording to King Hussein for a formal appeal for military 
assistance should it be required. The aim was to ensure an appeal written satisfactorily to 
persuade both the public and the United Nations [UN] that any intervention was legitimate 
under international law, despite the lack of a UN resolution.
64
  
 Macmillan also seized the opportunity and hawkishly asked Eisenhower what forces 
he would make available to any such request from the King Hussein and urged a 
commitment for a “joint intention”.65 Speaking to Eisenhower by telephone on 14 July – in a 
conversation where he repeatedly drew upon his personal relationship, referring to the 
president as “dear friend” three times – he emphasised, “we have got to see it together, dear 
friend” and “as long as I understand we are in this together. We are doing this together.”66 
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This emphasis was not lost on Eisenhower who noted in his memoirs, “He was anxious . . . 
he wanted my assurances that we were in this together, all the way.”67 
 The replies from Washington were slow, which troubled Macmillan. Whilst 
Eisenhower did not directly reply to Macmillan’s telegrams, there were also concerns that 
Dulles was hesitant about a Jordan mission.
68
 In fact, this proved to be true; Dulles was 
sceptical about what could be achieved in Jordan, worrying that an intervention would 
weaken King Hussein’s position in the long-term.69 He also had suspicions about British 
motives as well as the necessity and desirability of the intervention.
70
  
 To counteract the slow progress, Macmillan quickly despatched Selwyn Lloyd to 
Washington with the aim of securing as much support as possible from the Eisenhower 
Administration for intervention and taking the added precaution of monitoring American 
public reaction.
71
 However, whilst Selwyn Lloyd was enroute, on the evening of 16 July, the 
formal request for assistance arrived. Having learnt the lesson from Suez, Macmillan refused 
to provide any commitment to King Hussein until he had received approval for British 
intervention from Eisenhower. Pragmatically, he was also particularly concerned that United 
States forces in Lebanon might withdraw, leaving Britain alone in the region to deal with 
Jordan and Iraq. He later concluded, “Nothing could be worse for our position in the Middle 
East than to find ourselves exposed and then abandoned”.72 As a result, according to notes 
taken from a meeting with the minister of defence and Chiefs of Staff on whether to provide 
military assistance to Jordan, the first consideration was “the reply from President 
Eisenhower”.73  
Macmillan immediately called a Cabinet meeting, which lasted three hours. During 
the course of the meeting, he phoned Dulles twice to gain support and confirm his position. 
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Again the prime minister did not receive the answer for which he was hoping. In the first 
call, he consulted with Dulles over the British course of action and stressed the desire for 
American support:  
M [Macmillan] asked if they should send their people in. The Sec [Dulles] said not 
tonight. M said we want to do it together. The Sec said we told Congress Tuesday 
nothing beyond what was explained to them would be done and we can’t alter without 
consultation. M is unhappy doing it alone tonight – we may get separated when we 
are beautifully together. The Sec said we can make clear verbally our approval but 
can’t do more.74  
Macmillan had succeeded in securing political and moral support but was looking for 
something more substantial, particularly American boots on the ground. In the second 
conversation, 90 minutes later, Macmillan had specific questions: Would the United States 
give Britain moral support? Would it provide an air demonstration? Would it provide 
logistical support and, perhaps later, men?
75
 The American record of the conversation also 
states a request for providing support in the UN.
76
 The response was reserved but positive. 
The follow-up telegram from Lord Hood, minister at the Washington Embassy, confirmed 
that the Eisenhower Administration would not respond to the request from Hussein due to 
Congressional restraints, but it would provide a demonstration flight of aircraft over 
Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan.  In addition, Dulles agreed that if Britain did send troops, the 
action would have his support.
77
 Following this reassurance, Macmillan advised King 
Hussein about the granting of his request for military assistance.
78
  He also felt the need to 
emphasise that this decision had occurred in consultation with the Americans.  
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 Once the operation in Jordan began, the need for including the United States became 
a combination of intention and pragmatic necessity, and Macmillan worked hard to manage 
the Americans throughout. On 17 July 1958, the 16 Independent Parachute Brigade flew 
from Cyprus to Jordan, with the Guards Brigade on standby to follow. The flight required 
overflying Israeli territory, and Selwyn Lloyd received instructions on 14 July to consider 
how to obtain the permission of the Israeli government to do so.
79
 However, seeking 
permission had not occurred because of the confusion of Selwyn Lloyd travelling to 
Washington and Macmillan leaving the launch of operations in the early hours of the 
morning to the Cabinet secretary, Norman Brook. As a result, when the Israelis discovered 
that British air transport had violated their airspace, the British airplanes received orders to 
land with some aircraft fired upon by anti-aircraft batteries.
80
  
 The Israelis had also learnt from Suez the importance of securing American support. 
David Ben Gurion, the Israeli prime minister, advised the American ambassador that Israel 
would not grant the British permission for overflying until Washington gave assurances of 
aid to Israel if it became the subject of retaliation from other Powers.
81
 At the same time as 
Ben Gurion negotiated with the Americans, Brook was trying desperately to remedy the 
situation from London. Receiving no reply from Israel, he reached out to Washington and 
requested diplomatic support.
82
 In a similar vein to Macmillan, Ben Gurion only conceded 
overflying approval after waking Dulles at 2:30 am to receive a personal reassurance of 
support.
83
 
 Despite granting permission, Ben Gurion’s actions were domestically unpopular and 
he soon came under heavy Soviet pressure to renege on the agreement. Two days after the 
start of the operation, Selwyn Lloyd reported that the Israelis were making overflying 
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difficult and again put pressure on Washington for diplomatic assistance.
84
 The next day 
Macmillan received a message from the Israeli government to stop all overflying forthwith.
85
 
Although not amounting to a formal withdrawal of permission, it presented the British with a 
serious problem: there was no immediate alternative to overflying Israeli territory and the 
British forces at Amman were reliant on air transport for circa 100 tons a day of food, stores, 
and ammunition.
86
 The solution, according to the Cabinet Defence Committee, was to 
convince the Americans to provide the entirety of the supply themselves, especially since 
they were successfully over-flying Israel to provide provisions to their own troops in 
Lebanon. This would not only solve the problem at hand but would also result in engaging 
the Americans in the joint action that Macmillan had long since desired: “Equally, there 
would be great advantage in persuading the United States Government to accept the 
responsibility of organising the transport column from Aqaba to Amman and generally co-
operating with us.”87 In fact, an early planning note passed to the deputy chief of staff had 
explicitly stated that this was an aim: “For political reasons we are anxious to involve the US 
in Jordan. As they may not agree to stationing troops we feel that they should participate in 
the airlift”.88 
 By 22 July, the situation had become more desperate as the Israelis reduced the 
permitted overflying time from 24 to nine hours a day. As a result, Macmillan again appealed 
directly to Eisenhower for support.  He explained that the British troops in Jordan had only 
12 days of food and oil supplies and only a few days of ammunition. He also reiterated the 
request put to Dulles for the Americans to take-over the airlift.
89
 The next day Eisenhower 
agreed; United States Air Force Globemasters would take-over the provision of supply.
90
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Macmillan had succeeded in his long held endeavour to secure a formal military relationship 
for the operation.
91
 
 Despite securing the airlift, Macmillan and Selwyn Lloyd continued to push for more 
military and logistical support with the ultimate hope of securing American boots on the 
ground to stand alongside British forces. On the day that the British operation began, 
Macmillan sent Selwyn Lloyd to Washington to meet with the State Department and White 
House to stress that the British were still hoping for American military participation.
92
 The 
memorandum of the conversation with Dulles records that Selwyn Lloyd declared, “the 
British by going into Jordan had put themselves in an extremely vulnerable position. He said 
he would feel much more certain of the security of the British position if the United States 
also had troops in Jordan.”93 In later speaking with Eisenhower, he re-emphasised his 
position, first by thanking the Administration for its support thus far and, then, adding, “This 
was all to the good but the British Government would be particularly happy if the Jordanian 
exercise could be a truly joint operation.”94 Eisenhower remained unconvinced and instead 
compared the Lebanon and Jordan operations to that of the division of effort over the Allied 
invasion of North Africa in 1942, an analogy well known to Macmillan.
95
 These words did 
not prevent Selwyn Lloyd from pushing one more time at the end of the meeting for 
American participation in Jordan, again to no avail. 
 Five days later Macmillan decided to try his personal touch to achieve the same 
objective. Stating fresh concerns about an impending coup, he appealed to Eisenhower from 
a military and political perspective: “I believe the essential thing is that you should send in 
some American troops to be alongside ours on the ground. Not only would this increase the 
military strength of the forces in Jordan, but it would have an extremely favourable political 
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effect”.96 This missive arrived at the same time as a similar telegram from Amman.  On 20 
July, King Hussein had stated to the press that he had asked for, and expected, American 
troops. The next day his prime minister, Samir al-Rifai, called the American ambassador to 
appeal for the despatch of 2,500 to 3,000 troops to Jordan. He dwelt on the negative impact 
of having only British troops and advised of the public concerns of re-occupation by British 
forces and the rising calls for general strikes in protest and demands for withdrawal.
97
 There 
followed the ambassador’s approach to see Hussein the King who, supported by the British 
ambassador, reiterated the request for American ground troops and an added appeal for air 
power.
98
 Whether a co-ordinated British-Jordanian endeavour manufactured these requests 
remains unknown. Regardless, it failed to have the desired effect; the counsellor of the 
American Embassy in Amman, Thomas Wright, reported to the State Department: “My 
opinion [is that] every argument advanced by Hussein and [the] British for United States 
troops is good reason we should stay out.”99 Eisenhower agreed and remained firm. He did 
not think it either wise or necessary to provide troops and used public opinion and difficulties 
with Congress as the scapegoat for the decision.
100
  
 These developments did not deter Macmillan, who continued to consider ideas on 
how to engage the Americans further to accelerate and formalise the re-building relationship. 
This process included the provision of American civilian technicians to maintain United 
States aircraft flying to Amman to provide the British with supplies. Also considered were 
ancillary forces to open up communications.
101
 Two weeks later, the Cabinet Defence 
Committee discussed further ideas including, perhaps controversially, asking Washington to 
charter merchant vessels to fly the American flag and bring supplies to the British down the 
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Suez Canal.
102
 Macmillan also put in requests to Dulles for everything from the transport of 
drummed aviation fuel to maintenance of an airstrip and refrigerated containers.
103
 
 In addition, Macmillan succeeded in securing close co-operation at the military 
planning level. Prior to the sending of troops, the British and Americans set-up local 
operational liaison for their forces and planning liaison in London, with these relationships 
continuing throughout the Lebanon and Jordan campaigns.
104
 This military planning was 
particularly important for negotiating the joint withdrawal of forces – an endeavour pushed 
by Selwyn Lloyd to demonstrate a united Anglo-American operation and ensure not leaving 
British troops over-exposed.
105
 It also provided an existing forum for the British to develop 
further joint military planning used to consider on-going action in the wider Middle Eastern 
region after withdrawal.
106
 
 Throughout the operation, Macmillan also sought to secure continuing political and 
moral commitments. He and Selwyn Lloyd both worked hard to keep the Americans engaged 
throughout the campaign. Echoing the tone of Macmillan’s phone conversation with Dulles 
the night before the start of the Jordan operation, management of the intervention ensured 
that Eisenhower’s Administration felt constantly consulted and informed. It had the dual 
effect of increasingly inter-twining Washington within the operation and ensuring that 
“Operation Fortitude” would not repeat the secrecy and lack of understanding that cursed 
Anglo-Franco-Israeli operations in Suez. Eisenhower described his relationship with 
Macmillan at this time as being “in finger-tip communication”.107 
 During these communications, Macmillan was continuously at pains to stress that the 
British were not “going it alone” but, rather, that the United States and Britain were “in it 
together”. Even without the existence of a joint mission, Macmillan continually took 
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opportunities to emphasise to Eisenhower the importance of Anglo-American unity for the 
operation; and how their working together would continue into the future. On 18 July, he 
wrote to the president: 
My great consolation is that we are together in these two operations in Lebanon and 
Jordan. We must at all costs not be divided now when we have been forced to play for 
such high stakes. I am sure that Foster and Selwyn will be able to work out together a 
joint plan for the future.
108
 
He ended by stressing “our close and intimate cooperation together”. Selwyn Lloyd agreed 
and emphasised that “it is desperately important” for the United States and Britain to keep 
together on Lebanon and Jordan.
109
  
 Macmillan also leveraged his relationship with Washington for diplomatic support in 
handling the UN and Russian responses to the intervention.
110
 All policy decisions came after 
full consultation with Washington. In a revealing telegram from London to the UN 
delegation in New York, the Foreign Office advised: 
In continuing your discussions with the Secretary General[,] I hope you will take care 
to emphasise their informal, exploratory basis. Our present views are still tentative 
and until we have discussed them with the Americans[,] we do not want to give Mr 
Hammarskjold [the UN secretary general] the impression that they represent firm 
policy decisions.
111
 
An informal working committee set-up within the British Embassy at Washington to co-
ordinate issues specifically related to Jordan, including the UN negotiations, managed this 
liaison and negotiation. The committee met once a day and was described by Dulles as 
performing “an excellent job”.112 
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Finally, Macmillan also used the Americans to help manage British economic 
realities. Not only did he have to pull the strings of the Eisenhower Administration, he also 
had to keep tight control on the strings of the British purse. During the Jordan crisis, he 
looked to achieve both by seeking a financial commitment from Washington to help with the 
operation. Again, Macmillan stressed this issue to Eisenhower from the outset of the 
operation via Hood: “The Prime Minister said that there was a great burden on the United 
Kingdom. There was already great pressure on the pound which meant a lot of money being 
spent to maintain its value . . . . He hoped that the US Government understood this.”113 His 
efforts paid off. The United States provided economic assistance in a number of ways 
including funding the payment to the Shell Oil Company and British Petroleum for the initial 
supplies of oil to reach Aqaba.
114
 The Americans also took over the funding of the Jordanian 
Royal family and army – which had become increasingly too heavy a burden for the British, 
totalling around $40.5 million per year – and earmarked $10 million for Jordanian 
development.
115
 In comparison, the British only offered Jordan £1 million in budgetary aid 
and a similar amount in interest free development loans.
116
  
 Following the end of the Suez imbroglio, London identified two clear lessons for the 
future; Britain could no longer afford its position in the world; and it, therefore, would have 
to work with the Americans in all future interventions. Macmillan was privy to these lessons 
and had come to similar conclusions; but he saw that combining lessons learnt could benefit 
Britain in the long-term if Washington could be persuaded to support its ally politically, 
diplomatically, militarily, and economically. He wanted to be able to utilise American power 
to help Britain in areas that it could no longer afford to maintain, slowing down and 
managing British decline by bolstering British policy with American support.  
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 To achieve this aim, Macmillan searched for means to commit the United States to 
helping and working with the British. Even before rising to the premiership, Macmillan 
began efforts to re-build relations with Washington and, upon becoming prime minister, 
leveraged his personal connexions with Eisenhower to accelerate andthe revitalise good 
relations between the two Powers. He also sought to institutionalise the process, first, to 
make it harder for the Americans to withdraw support and, second, to send a clear message to 
the global community of the renewed strength of the Anglo-American special relationship. 
Achieving this commitment from Washington was a slow process with little effort from 
across the Atlantic and early disappointment when Eisenhower rejected British participation 
in the American operation in Lebanon.  
 However, the Jordan crisis provided a new and unique opportunity seized upon 
Macmillan. Although there were limits to what the Americans were prepared to offer,
117
 and 
Macmillan never achieved his ultimate ambition to make it a truly joint operation, he 
masterfully used the situation to his advantage and expanded American commitments of 
support as the operation progressed. Rather than demonstrating a subservient British foreign 
policy, the operation in Jordan revealed an active prime minister determined to use personal 
connexions and long-term allies for the benefit of Britain, pulling the strings of the 
Eisenhower Administration to achieve his own ends.  
 By the end of the campaign, it seemed as if Macmillan had managed a number of his 
objectives. He had proved to be a critical actor in returning the trans-Atlantic relationship to 
its pre-Suez state. Despite some initial tension, and lingering resentment and suspicions on 
both sides, the Anglo-American alliance exited the Jordan operation stronger than it has 
entered.
118
 He also managed to negotiate a simultaneous rise of British prestige – through a 
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successful return to the Middle East and decline in economic responsibility – by convincing 
the United States to take over much of the financial responsibility for Jordan. These actions 
are in stark opposition toby the orthodox claims of scholars about British subservience to 
American foreign policy after Suez. Instead, it reveals Macmillan as an agent of learning 
whoand managed change for British advantage. 
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